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Abstract 
This paper analyses the management of   high-profile geopolitically sensitive threats (verifying 
potential terrorist identity, hostage rescue and national/international security). Defining features 
of such cases include decision makers’ ability to prospectively model competing binary (e.g., 
do/do not use lethal force), categorical (i.e., choosing between options – e.g., ground forces or 
unmanned weapons system) or ordinal (e.g., level of acceptable collateral damage) future 
scenarios in which they must select between options and where every outcome looks aversive and 
high risk (i.e., ‘damned if you do or damned if you don’t decisions’).  A frequent consequence of 
such prospective calculations is ‘decision inertia’ (i.e., a failure to execute an important, 
irrevocable decision resulting in non-optimal consequences), or ‘implementation failure’ (i.e., a 
failure to make a choice).  This paper provides a theoretical platform from which to view, 
understand and, most importantly, minimize decision inertia and failures to act.   By combining 
the benefit of the theoretical framework and hindsight knowledge of the analyzed critical 
incidents, the paper also helps identify past decisional mistakes, areas of improvement, in order to 
inform live assessment and management of similar geopolitical threats in the future.  
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Between a Rock and a Hard Place of Geopolitically Sensitive Threats 
Understanding the antecedents of faulty decisions when facing highly complex threats to 
national security is critical considering the similar debates underway elsewhere on legal use of 
force against states believed to pose a threat of disastrous attack (Waxman, 2009).  For example, 
the assessment and management of the threat is currently being debated regarding the uranium-
enrichment program run by Iran and NATO’s corresponding decision inertia; the ongoing conflict 
in Syria and Iraq, and the deadlock around direct intervention against ISIS; and the continuing, 
albeit ethically, legally and socially challenged (Cornwell, 2013), deployment of drones on 
foreign soil by US Forces.  This creates a research gap regarding the dynamic nature of high-
stakes strategic decision-making, particularly when facing geopolitical “least-worst” decisions. 
The SAFE-T model, developed by van den Heuvel, Alison and Crego (2012a), is based on 
an extensive evaluation of strategic decision-making literature and detailed analyses of 
practitioners making decisions in naturalistic environments (Alison et al., 2013).  The model 
proposes that an optimal process-driven decision-making model involves four key phases that 
facilitate accurate and updated assessments of the situation, and are focused on concurrent 
learning (van den Heuvel, Alison, & Power, 2012b).  The phases include: Situation Assessment 
(SA), Plan Formulation (F) and Plan Execution (E), followed by an incremental and transitional 
team learning (T) phase to consolidate learning.  During a Situation Assessment phase, decision 
makers use available intelligence to formulate a working understanding of the current situation, 
define the parameters of the given problems (Bransford & Stein, 1984) and consider possible 
ramifications (Endsley, 1995).  
Following this, and to ensure that adequate intelligence has been gathered  (van den 
Heuvel et al., 2012a), decision makers enter a Plan Formulation stage, using cognitive resources 
to refine SA and to develop situational hypotheses based on evaluation of available 'action 
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strategies' in relation to the current intelligence (Thunholm, 2005).  During the Plan Execution 
phase, plans are turned into action, resources are deployed and, crucially, containment measures 
can be activated to prevent escalation of the incident (van den Heuvel et al., 2012a; ACPO, 2009). 
Throughout decision making processes, decision makers must continually reflect on and revise 
assessments (Eraut, 2000), adapting responses to fit demands of the evolving dynamic and volatile 
situation, which, in conjunction with feedback from team members (House, Power & Alison, 
2013), facilitates Team Learning (van den Heuvel et al., 2012b).  
Factors influencing 'Least-worst first' Plan Execution 
 There are a number of situational factors inherent in high stakes decision-making that 
affect the ability or motivation to make prompt, effective choices, stalling decision making at 
various SAFE-T cycle phases, particularly the Plan Execution phase.  Both the rational emotional 
(Anderson’s, 2003) and ‘SAFE-T’ models (van den Heuvel et al., 2012a), identify several factors 
that can stall decision-making.  These include accountability, anticipated regret, culture and 
history, uncertainty, mutability, effort-accuracy trade-offs and temporality.  
Accountability can be defined as the expectation of an individual, group or organization to 
be evaluated by a salient audience and for either rewards or sanctions to be implemented as a 
result (Hall et al., 2003).  Anticipation of future accountability can influence behavior in the 
present (Frink & Klimoski, 2004), affecting information gathering and interpretation processes 
(Situation Assess phase), along with reinforcement and defense of decisions committed when 
pursuing goals (Plan Formulate and Execute phases) (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996).  In 
complex situations, accountability can encourage more information to be taken into consideration 
without first discerning its relevance, thereby increasing cognitive load (Tetlock & Boettger, 
1989).  Increased accountability can encourage motivation for self-preservation, detracting 
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attention away from the task and further inhibiting ability to discriminate between critically 
relevant and irrelevant information (Waring et al., 2012).  
Given that geo-politically sensitive cases are played out in cultural and historical social 
contexts, such contexts also play a role in decision processes.  This might be exemplified by a 
very cautious approach of the Obama administration to the direct military involvement in 
president’s Bashar Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, which was very likely informed by a range of many 
new threats that emerged in the wake of the invasion of President Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and 
imposition of the no-fly zone in Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s Lybia.  Historical social-contexts 
can also have follow-on effects in decision-making by informing the development of analogies 
that may (or may not) accurately represent the modern state of affairs.  
An additional factor that can encourage risk avoidance is a high degree of uncertainty, 
which is a crucial component governing decision making (van den Heuvel et al., 2012a) and can 
be defined as a sense of doubt that blocks or delays action (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997).  
Uncertainty is often discussed in relation to risk (the potential to incur loss) (Molm, Schaefer, & 
Collett, 2009) due to the influence one can have over the other. It arises as a result of some 
unknown feature in the state of the world (e.g. knowing how much trust to place in intelligence 
sources) or being unsure about the consequences of actions (e.g. knowing whether a plan will 
reduce or increase the terror risk) (Kirschenbaum, 2011).  The ability to cope with uncertainty 
impacts on the quality and timeliness of decisions made (Wickens & Holland, 2000; Fischhoff, 
2011; Fischoff & Kadvany, 2011).  Van den Heuvel et al. (2012a) found that high levels of 
environmental uncertainty in counterterrorism operations could encourage police to become 
excessively focused on the potentially negative consequences of a decision for being held to 
account, consequently losing sight of strategic concerns.  Accordingly, uncertainty may lead to 
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accountogenic decisions as decision makers worrying about being ‘named and shamed’ for 
unknown, but potentially negative, outcomes (Anderson, 2003).   
In risky environments, where outcomes are uncertain and where those making the 
decisions perceive they are highly accountable, the decision making process can become stalled at 
the Plan Execution phase of the SAFE-T cycle. Van den Heuvel et al. (2012a) examined this 
consequence in relation to strategic ‘save life' decisions in counter-terrorism simulations and 
found that decision avoidant strategies such as choice deferral and omission bias resulted. 
Inappropriate deferral entailed either putting off making a decision or referring the decision to 
another party.  In a particularly uncertain decision environment, the essential decision of whether 
or not to declare an incident as 'critical' (and therefore bring pertinent organisations’ procedures 
into play) was commonly deferred by participating officers until the last minute (van den Heuvel 
et al., 2012a).  
Mutability, the ability to change the previous circumstances of an event so that the 
outcome is reversed (Morris & Moore, 2000) can also lead to decision derailment.  For example, a 
hostage situation where the hostage takers are willing to negotiate has high outcome mutability, 
whereas if hostage takers are intent on making a political point through spectacle and there is little 
time for a physical intervention, the situation has low outcome mutability.  Mutability varies, 
which makes it easier for people to mentally reverse the outcome for some events over others 
(Wells & Gavanski, 1989).  Human actions are perceived to be more mutable due to being judged 
as more controllable (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Morris, Moore, & Sim, 1999), and people are 
more likely to search for alternative outcomes when the actual outcome was unexpected or 
harmful (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).  Greater responsibility is attributed to decision makers for 
highly mutable events because the easier it is to mentally undo the outcome, the more the decision 
maker is viewed to have been able to prevent it (Coombs & Holladay, 2011).  This suggests that 
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decision makers may experience greater accountability pressure and anticipated regret in 
situations where the potential for a negative outcome is uncertain but potentially high, along with 
perceived outcome reversibility.  Thus, highly mutable events may contribute toward greater 
decision avoidance, thereby affecting the execution of plans. 
  The final factor to be discussed in terms of its potential to derail robust decision strategies 
is the effort-accuracy trade-off made by decision makers in selecting a course of action (Johnson 
& Payne, 1985).  According to Russo and Dosher (1983), the selection of decision strategies is 
partly influenced by the accuracy of the strategy and how much effort (total use of cognitive 
resources) will be needed to complete the task. Payne (1982) notes that two factors can affect the 
accuracy and effort of different decision strategies: task variables, the general characteristics of 
the problem, such as the number of alternative options available; and context variables, the values 
assigned to different options.  This, in effect, represents a qualitative and quantitative distinction. 
Johnson and Payne (1985) found that the effectiveness of decision strategies is affected by task 
variables (quantity) whereas effort is affected by context variables (quality).  Different strategies 
are more effective and require more effort in different contexts.  Accordingly, a compromise may 
be made between accuracy and effort when selecting a decision strategy but the more important 
the decision, the more emphasis may be placed on accuracy over effort (Johnson & Payne, 1985).  
The present study 
Whilst the SAFE-T model represents an optimal strategy for decision making in complex, 
dynamic, high risk and high stake environments, there are several factors that may derail this 
including: accountability, uncertainty, mutability and effort-accuracy trade-off.  As is seen above, 
these factors have the potential to lead to incorrect decisions outcomes and poor threat 
management.  Furthermore, failure to select effective options and to put these into action in a 
timely manner (the result of both choice deferral and decision inertia) may facilitate the negative 
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escalation of a situation, which further derails decision processes.  This study will demonstrate the 
applicability of the SAFE-T model by examining a series of strategically complex incidents where 
binary, categorical and ordinal options were considered.  
METHOD 
Sample  
Forty five incidents were identified through open-source searching of reports coming from 
a variety of American, British and Russian official unclassified online intelligence sources and 
media reports (including the Independent Police Complaints Commission1, the Central 
Intelligence Agency online library2, Yale University Library Slavic and East European 
Collection3, Russian Television website, the Moscow Times, the Independent, the New York 
Times, Time and the Guardian).  All authors evaluated each incidents’ geopolitical, historical and 
media importance.  Based on their agreed-upon importance and the three most recurrent types of 
high-profile geopolitically sensitive threats (verifying potential terrorist identity, hostage rescue 
and national/international security), ten heavily publicized and geo-politically sensitive critical 
incidents were identified.  The characteristics of these 10 incidents relate to three types of 
strategically complex decision: verifying potential terrorist identity, hostage rescue and national 
security.  Accordingly, analysis relates to a wide range of decisions made in terror threat incidents 
rather than being restricted to one particular type of decision problem.  
RESULTS 
Identifying the Presence of Derailment Factors 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 below provide details of the ten incident reports analyzed along with 
information on the extent the SAFE-T model was adhered to, mutability of outcomes, factors that 
                                                          
1 http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/ 
2 https://www.cia.gov/library 
3 http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/ 
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may have derailed decision processes, evidence of choice deferral, trade-offs made between effort 
and accuracy, and evidence of decision inertia.  All reports are based on various high profile geo-
political terror incidents that have occurred over the last fifty years and have been categorized into 
three types of decisions; establishing potential terrorist identity, hostage rescue or 
national/international security. 
Table 1 displays the results of the analysis for the three reports relating to establishing 
potential terrorist identity.  Case A refers to an incident in which London Metropolitan police 
misidentified Jean Charles de Menezes as a terror suspect and shot him dead at Stockwell tube 
station in 2005.4  Case B refers to a suicide attack against a CIA Forward Operating Base located 
in Afghanistan in 2009, resulting in the death of seven CIA officers and seriously wounding six 
others.  In both of these incidents, decision making was ineffective due to poor SA and PF. 
Although plans were executed swiftly and decision inertia was relatively low, the difficulties in 
assessing of each situation and ability to plan adequately contributed toward disastrous outcomes. 
Conversely, Case C refers to a raid led by the CIA and US armed forces (Operation Neptune), 
which resulted in America meeting its desired objective of eliminating the head of the Islamist 
militant group al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. Unlike the previous two cases, there was a relative 
absence of time pressure in this incident that allowed the CIA time to conduct thorough SA and 
PF, and to reduce uncertainty by gathering further confirmatory information.  However, the 
disadvantage of lack of acute time constraint was the potential for decision inertia. 
Table 2 displays the results of analysis for the three incident reports concerning decisions 
made on hostage rescue. Case A refers to an incident in which 11 members of the Israeli Olympic 
team and a German police officer were taken hostage and eventually killed by a Palestinian 
                                                          
4 See http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/investigations/jean-charles-de-menezes-stockwell-metropolitan-police-service 
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terrorist group, Black September, during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich. Case B refers to 
an incident that took place in 2002 in which 850 hostages were held for two and a half days by a 
group of approximately 40 armed Chechens in a Russian theatre, resulting in Spetsnaz (Special 
Purpose Forces) releasing noxious gases that killed all 40 attackers along with 130 hostages.  Case 
C refers to an incident in which a school in Beslan, North Ossetia–Alania in Russia, was taken 
hostage for three days in 2004 by a group of Islamic separatist militants, resulting in Russian 
security forces storming the building using heavy weapons, the overall result being the death of 
331 people (186 of which were children).  Common to all these three incidents was extreme 
difficulty in establishing SA, extreme challenges with regards to multi agency planning and 
shared operating pictures and lack of effective planning at some point during the chain of events, 
including failure to accurately assess and manage threats.  However, whereas it is possible to 
imagine that the first two events could have been prevented due to their predictability, the Beslan 
Siege was far more unpreventable due to the provincial nature of the school and the number of 
such rural schools in Russia. There were several high stakes involved in the Beslan Siege, 
including the presence of school children and the knowledge of the disastrous outcome of the 
previous hostage incident in the Moscow theatre crisis just two years earlier.  These may have 
served to increase accountability pressure leading to decision inertia.  
Table 3 displays the results of analysis for the four incident reports relating to decisions 
made regarding national/international security.  Case A refers to one of the largest confrontations 
during the Cold War in which the Soviet Union and Cuba nearly came into nuclear conflict with 
the US, but resulted in a peace agreement in 1962. Case B refers to an incident in 1995 in which a 
rocket launched for research purposes by Norwegian and American scientists entered Russian air 
space, narrowly avoiding nuclear retaliation from Russia when the rocket was mistaken for a US 
Navy Trident missile.  Case C relates to two controversial suspected Iraqi weapons storage 
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facilities in Khamisiyah and Muhammadiyat, and decisions around the search for WMD.  Case D 
refers to an Israeli military operation in which six Turkish boats carrying humanitarian aid were 
boarded for inspection because they broke an Israeli blockade, resulting in the death of nine 
Turkish nationals who resisted inspection, and a breakdown in relations between Israel and 
Turkey. Both Cases B and D were subject to time pressure and uncertainty, which hindered the 
ability to conduct thorough SA, PF and PE.   However, in the Norwegian rocket incident, a crisis 
was avoided because of the high motivation to save lives in combination with the ability to hold 
off on acting without further confirmation of direct threat to the Russian population.  In the case 
of the Russian Missile Crisis, SA, PF and PE were very thorough due to the motivation for 
accuracy and saving lives along with the lack of imminent time pressure, which allowed all parties 
time to seek further information to reduce uncertainty.   
As can be seen from this analysis, regardless of the type of decision made in relation to 
terror threat assessment and management, there are several common derailment factors that can 
negatively impact decision making; and the presence of these factors ultimately has consequences 
for the outcome of an incident. There is evidence that when SA, PF and PE are effective (as in 
Operation Neptune and the Cuban Missile Crisis) and when time pressure is low, this facilitates 
improved decision making.  However, the potential danger may be for decision makers to 
procrastinate, continuing to seek further information even when this is not forthcoming, which 
may lead to decision inertia and failure to act in a timely manner.  Whilst time pressure may 
negatively impact on performance, there is evidence that SA, PF and PE can be poor even when 
acute time pressure is not an issue (as in the Moscow Theatre Hostage Crisis) and that this can 
negatively impact on ability to assess and manage critical threats.  Within these situations, 
accountability and motivation to protect the image of a home nation can serve as derailment 
factors.  
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The results of this first analysis demonstrate the practical and theoretical relevance of 
applying the SAFE-T model in it demonstrated that there are several types of derailment factors, 
consistent with SAFE-T model that are common across various terror threat decisions.  In order to 
further elaborate upon in the stages of SAFE-T, a detailed analysis of the search for WMDs in 
Iraq was provided.  This international security incident was chosen for several reasons, firstly, 
there is ample de-classified reports that can be used to support analysis, secondly, threat 
assessments of WMDs are a highly relevant consideration for practitioners considering currently 
unfolding events in both Syria and Iran.  
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 1, 2 AND 3 HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of our paper was to advance a descriptive phase model of strategic decision 
making in relation to minimizing and neutralizing terror threats.  Adopting an integrated non-
laboratory approach, our intention was to highlight the practical and theoretical relevance of 
applying the SAFE-T model for analyzing key decision processes in high-stake, uncertain 
situations that involve the search for the least-worst option.  To this end, we presented a 
contextualized way of using the SAFE-T model (van den Heuvel et al., 2012) which could help 
identify past decisional mistakes, areas of improvement and potentially help inform live 
assessment and management of similar geopolitical threats in the future.  
What the SAFE-T model can offer is an insight-generating platform for a systematic and 
detailed evaluation of the key factors involved in strategically complex decisions.  However, 
given the limited adequacy of rational choice theories in politics (Schelling, 1993), economics 
(Kahneman, 2003) and everyday life (Ariely, 2008; Bennis, Medin & Bartels, 2010; Nisbett & 
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Ross, 1980), the need for future research to expand and refine this model, for example by adding 
new dimensions and layers of cross-comparisons, is paramount.   Such expansion and refinement 
of the model might also help with the decisional analysis of current and critical threats.  This 
approach may then support current considerations regarding the assessment of the probability and 
extent of the use of chemical weapons in new conflict zones (e.g., Syria) may be supported by 
drawing on the exemplified analysis of the threat allegedly posed by the Hussein regime.  For 
example, although the UN states that it has not been possible ‘to determine the precise chemical 
agents used [in Syria], their delivery systems or the perpetrator’ (2013), a SAFE-T perspective 
would argue that the ‘effort accuracy trade-off’ of the Obama Administration resulted in the 
official decision to start shipping arms to Syrian rebels with a view to vetting and training them 
(Barnes, 2013), but failing to anticipate the rise of ISIS.   
Needless to say, and given the enormous challenges posed by ‘real world’ threats, the 
SAFE-T model is not without its flaws; its current dimensions, for example, may not always be 
exhaustive enough, potentially posing the risk of constraining front-line tactical decision makers 
by narrowing their view of available options.  Furthermore, given the methodological constraints 
related to information availability, we did not take into account factors like individual differences, 
although such differences are likely to be significant, particularly when the executive decision lies 
with individuals rather than with groups.  For example, decision makers with a low tolerance of 
ambiguity tend to reach judgment more quickly, making decision inertia less likely and increasing 
the risk of errors than those with a high tolerance for ambiguity who are able to make decisions 
and take action despite incomplete information, follow through on these decisions, all the while 
observing and course-correcting even when the exact focus isn't entirely clear in a given moment.  
The model may also draw their attention to a schematic set of elements that may vary in 
their importance, relevance and usefulness from situation to situation, which might marginalize 
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the unique situational specificity of critical incidents.  This, in turn, might hinder creative 
‘outside-the-box’ thinking, limiting the subtlety of generated insights and increasing the risk of 
errors of commission (i.e., ineffective, counter-effective decisions) and omission (i.e., missed 
decisional opportunities).  Furthermore, it remains to be explored how useful this still under-
developed model is in facilitating effective live, rather than post facto, geo-political decision 
making without the benefit of hindsight knowledge.  
Finally, the temporal nature of such dynamic incidents must be considered, specifically 
with reference to the emergence of decision derailments such as decision inertia.  Rapidly 
unfolding events that have high life-death consequences demand immediate responses.  Events 
such as the 2005 Jean Charles de Menezes Death, the 2002 Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis, and 
the 2010 Gaza Flotilla Raid evolved in less than 2 1/2 days and all were rated as low or very low 
in decision inertia.  Conversely, the 2012 Operation Neptune and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 
had a longer time horizon with multiple decision points throughout its course.  These incidents 
were all viewed as high in decision inertia.  Decision inertia is therefore correlated with the length 
of the time horizon. However, this has several significant co-variants that should be considered. 
Firstly, both the Charles de Mendez, Moscow Theatre Crisis and Gaza Flotilla Raid were 
undertaken by tactical teams (with strategic command support) and were not the result of foreign 
policy decisions involving multiple agencies and political parties (as were the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and Operation Neptune).  When considering the emergence of decision-inertia it is 
therefore critical to consider the temporal nature and the number of stakeholders involved within 
the decision-making process.  This is crucial to ensure that, when analyzing future high-stakes 
decision making decision inertia is not conflated with the natural time-delay associated with 
obtaining the required political or bureaucratic approval for a plan of action.  Future 
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considerations of decision inertia may therefore be best served being compared within incidents 
types (tactical, operational and strategic) rather than across.  
This paper forwarded an approach than integrates both exogenous and endogenous factors, 
while also identifying potential factors that can de-rail the process.  Although the SAFE-T model 
cannot provide tactical and strategic decision makers with ready-made ‘formulas’ for action and 
the relevance levels of the model’s dimension seem to vary depending on the unique context of 
geopolitical threats, this research does support that both the SAFE-T decision making process, and 
the derailment factors identified elsewhere (e.g. van den Heuvel et al., 2012a) do hold both 
practical and theoretical relevance for high-stakes geopolitical events.  Further application of this 
model may therefore assist in the identification of critical errors, helping to override the traps of 
decision deferral, derailment and inertia.  Further research, which might also evaluate how the 
model’s parameters relate to one another, is required to determine the conditions under which this 
model holds along with individual differences in the extent to which various derailment strategies 
affect decisions.   
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Table 1. Three Critical High Stake Decisions on Establishing Potential Terrorist Identity 
Incident 
case 
Safe-t model Outcome 
mutability   
Potential 
derailment 
factors 
Choice  deferral  Effort accuracy trade-off  Decision inertia Time horizon Cultural-historical and situational 
contexts   
A - The 
2005 Jean 
Charles de 
Menezes’ 
Death 
 
Situational assessment:  very 
poor due to severe time 
constraints. Also there were 
mistakes in police surveillance 
procedure that led to a failure 
to properly identify Menezes 
early on, leading to a radical 
response at Stockwell Tube 
station. For example, the 
surveillance officers later 
stated that they were satisfied 
that they had the correct 
man, noting that he Menezes 
had ‘Mongolian’ eyes. 
Plan formulation:  poor due to 
severe time constraints 
(emergency suspected suicide 
bomber elimination 
procedure applied in an 
avoidance-avoidance conflict). 
Plan execution: very swift, but 
in hindsight incorrect, 
resulting in severe 
accountability repercussions 
for the shooters and the 
whole British Police. 
 
High – the ease 
constructing 
counterfactual 
alternatives to 
stopping the 
suspected 
suicide bomber 
gives his family 
grounds for legal 
action, damaging 
the media-
labelled ‘over-
reactive trigger-
happy’ Met 
Police that  acted 
under enormous 
pressure and 
very high 
uncertainty. 
Menezes was 
linked to the 
CCTV 
photographs of 
the bombing 
suspects from 
the previous 
day. When he 
jumped back on 
the bus he had 
just alighted 
and carried on 
towards 
Stockwell, the 
officers tailing 
him interpreted 
the U-turn as an 
"anti-
surveillance" 
technique. This 
was 
compounded by 
the "awful" 
reception on 
the police 
radios, which 
hampered 
communication. 
Low - the decision 
to confirm the 
suspect’s identity 
was compounded 
by the enormous 
pressure to 
potentially stop him 
from activating a 
suspected suicide-
bomb vest, leaving 
little time for any 
action delay.        
 
 
High – the situational 
awareness presented an 
avoidance-avoidance 
conflict (one potential 
innocent life vs. many 
innocent lives at the 
tube station). Thus, the 
accuracy of confirming 
his identity became 
secondary. The efforts 
to neutralize the 
apparent suspect on the 
run became a top 
priority.          
 
 
 
Low – very limited 
time, highest stakes, 
high uncertainty 
and situational 
awareness 
indicating terrorist 
activity on the 
highest  level 
minimized the 
inertia regarding 
neutralizing the 
severe threat he 
seemed to pose at 
the time. 
 
 
Very narrow – the 
event unfolded very 
rapidly, leaving the 
officers very limited 
time to process all the 
relevant information. 
Whereas normally the Metropolitan 
Police very rarely use guns and 
avoid shooting to kill, the aftermath 
of 11 September 2001 attacks in the 
USA, led to the development of 
new guidelines for identifying, 
confronting and dealing peacefully 
with terrorist suspects (Operation 
Kratos). For example, the 
guidelines suggest that the head or 
lower limbs should be aimed at 
when a suspected suicide bomber 
appears to have no intention of 
surrendering as a hit to the torso 
may detonate an explosive belt. 
Also , there is no explicit legal 
requirement for armed officers to 
warn a suspect before firing as  
it may prompt the bomber to 
detonate his explosives.  
 
B - The 
2009 Camp 
Chapman 
attack in 
Afghanistan  
 
-- 
 
 
Situational assessment: poor 
(the agent had always been 
searched at the gate before. 
Plan formulation: ad hoc and 
contrary to the standard 
security procedures.   
Plan execution: swift but 
incorrect, resulting in a major 
blow to the CIA (7 officers, 
Very high – in 
hindsight 
searching the 
agent at the gate 
appears to have 
been the only 
appropriate 
option.  
The fact that 
another 
Jordanian was 
already at the 
camp and 
proven 
trustworthy 
influenced the 
decision the let 
Medium – the 
possibility of 
searching the agent  
at the gate was in 
conflict with 
keeping his trust. 
The option of 
frisking him within 
the compound 
Medium –  Given the 
past dealings with the 
agent, it seemed that  
a sub-optimal option 
could be tolerated at 
that particular time,  
minimizing his perceived 
threat and making the 
trade-off look attractive.                 
Medium- the agent 
had already visited 
the compound 
before, and  
subjective expected 
utility theory might 
explain letting him 
in unchecked better 
than rational 
Relatively narrow – 
the officers had the 
time to stop and 
carefully consider the 
potential benefits and 
risks of searching the 
agent. 
Al-Balawi, a Jordanian doctor, with 
a history of supporting violent 
Islamist causes online was believed 
to have been turned by Jordanian 
intelligence (GID) officials into a 
double agent.  When he was 
invited to Camp Chapman after 
claiming to have information 
related to senior al-Qaeda leader 
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including the chief of the base, 
and an officer 
of Jordan's General Intelligence 
Directorate, died) and forcing 
the subsequent stricter 
implementation of more rigid 
rather than flexible security 
procedures.  
the agent in 
unchecked.  
 
seemed attractive.  
 
emotional decision 
model.                     
Ayman al-Zawahiri, he was not 
searched because of his perceived 
value as an infiltrator. Also, he had 
already provided useful intelligence 
to the CIA over several weeks of 
undercover, winning the trust of 
the GID and the CIA, effectively 
becoming a triple agent. 
 
 
C - The 
2012 
Operation 
Neptune  
Situational assessment: great 
(the compound was under all-
inclusive (thermal image) 
surveillance for months.  
Plan formulation: meticulous 
with contingency plans at 
hand, presenting an approach-
approach conflict. 
Plan execution: swift with no 
intelligence shared with the 
Pakistani authorities, resulting 
in a resounding success and a 
major blow to Al Qaeda. 
  
High – the 
multiple risks of 
the operation 
were made salient 
by the broken and 
fallen US chopper, 
as well as the 
proximity to the 
distrusted 
‘Pakistan’s West 
Point.’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The detainees’ 
clues on Bin 
Laden’s couriers 
could not be 
fully verified. 
The 
‘vaccination’ 
trick to confirm 
Bin Laden’s 
identity did not 
work. The 
Pakistani
intelligence 
could not be 
trusted. The 
helicopters 
heading for the 
compound were 
flying low 
without 
appearing on 
Pakistani radars. 
One of them 
failed over the 
compound and 
crash landed.   
High – the CIA had 
plenty of time to 
observe the 
suspicious 
compound in 
Abbottabad to have 
reasonable 
confidence that it 
was Bin Laden’s 
hideout. They also 
had plenty of time 
to consider various
strike options 
before finally 
deciding to send 
SEALs. The conflict 
of engaging 
someone else than 
Bin Laden was 
minimized by the 
prospect of taking 
down an apparent 
senior criminal 
figure in hiding.                                                                                            
Low – Bin Laden was too 
valuable a target to miss 
through half-hearted 
efforts. Accuracy was 
imperative. 
 
 
.                                                
High – the loss 
aversion effect (e.g., 
tipping Bin Laden 
off) might explain 
why the decision to 
raid the compound 
was avoided for so 
long.   
Wide - the officers had 
plenty of time to 
analyse all the 
relevant information 
and carefully consider 
the raid on the 
compound.  
The CIA rented a home in 
Abbottabad from which a team 
staked out and observed the 
compound over several months. 
The CIA team used informants and 
other techniques - including a fake 
vaccination program to capture Bin 
Laden’s DNA, which failed to 
confirm his identity. The National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency also 
created three-dimensional 
renderings of the compound, 
including schedules describing 
residential traffic patterns, and 
assessed the number, height and 
gender of its residents. In order to 
critically review the circumstantial 
evidence and available facts of the 
Abbottabad compound, the CIA 
used a process called "red teaming" 
(using an independent group that 
challenges an organization to 
improve its effectiveness).  
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Table 2. Three Critical High Stake Decisions on Hostage Rescue   
Incident 
case 
Safe-t model Outcome 
mutability   
Potential derailment 
factors 
Choice  deferral  Effort accuracy 
trade-off  
Decision inertia Time horizon Cultural-historical and situational 
contexts   
A - The 
1972 
Munich 
Summer 
Olympic 
Crisis  
Situational assessment: very 
poor - according to Der Spiegel, 
the authorities failed to act on a 
tip-off from a Palestinian 
informant three weeks before 
the massacre. Also to help erase 
memories of the militaristic 
image of wartime Germany and, 
specifically, of the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics, security in the 
athletes' village was kept lax and 
athletes often came and went 
from the Olympic village without 
presenting proper identification.  
Plan formulation: careful but 
inaccurate and inherently flawed 
(the snipers lacked professional 
training).                                                           
Plan execution: very poor (the 
original plan was to intercept 
the hostage takers when they 
eventually moved from the 
compound, but this fell through 
when the interception team was 
spotted by the BS negotiator . 
Also the ambush team set up at 
the airport was only expecting 5 
hostages rather than 8. Finally,  
the under-equipped snipers and 
unprepared police failed to save 
anybody from the 11-strong 
Israeli Olympic Team). Also the 
police lost the advantage of 
surprise by botching one 
attempt to kill the kidnappers 
who spotted the trap on TV.                       
Very high – 
huge gaps in 
security 
make the 
event look 
entirely 
preventable. 
Even when 
the 
Olympians 
were taken 
hostage, the 
mistakes by 
the German 
authorities 
are glaring.                                                                                                             
The decision to try the 
final rescue was 
compounded by a 
previous foiled attempt 
to kill the hostage-
takers. Also the 
restrictions in the post-
war West 
German constitution, 
stopped the army from 
participating in the 
attempted rescue. The 
German snipers did not 
have radio contact with 
one another (nor with 
the German authorities 
conducting the rescue 
operation). Their 
rifles had no telescopic 
or infrared sights and 
were inadequate for the 
distance at which the 
snipers were trying to 
shoot. 
 
                                              
Medium – there was 
an apparent conflict 
between launching a 
rescue operation, 
which might have 
endangered the  
lives of the Israeli 
Olympians, and 
cooperating with the 
Jew-hating hostage 
takers (at least to an 
extent), which also 
put the Olympians in 
danger) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low - great 
caution was 
exercised not to 
harm the hostages 
and snipers were 
deployed at 
several strategic 
positions.     
 
  
Medium - the origin 
of the Olympians 
and the host 
country’s Nazi past 
made the risky 
decision to use 
force very difficult.                     
 
Relatively  narrow  - 
given that at all 
points the hostage 
takers were giving 
deadlines before 
they threatened to 
kill the hostages, the 
time pressure was 
present and the 
security services did 
not have the 
sufficient time to 
analyse all the  
relevant information 
and carefully 
consider the 
potential costs and 
benefits of using 
force.  
 
 
 
The Olympic organizers had asked  
West German forensic psychologist 
Georg Sieber to create 26 terrorism 
scenarios to aid the organizers in 
planning security. His ‘Situation 21’ 
correctly forecasted armed 
Palestinians invading the Israeli 
delegation's quarters, killing and 
taking hostages, and demanding 
Israel's release of prisoners and an 
escape plane. However, in order to 
avoid references to the Third Reich, 
the security in the Olympic Village 
was intentionally lax and the 
organizers decided not to prepare 
for Situation 21 and the other 
scenarios. Furthermore, the  
German authorities ignored a tip-off 
from a Palestinian informant about 
a planned ‘incident’ at the Olympic 
Games.  
B - The 
2002 
Moscow 
Situational assessment: very poor 
(it was clear that the kidnappers 
were heavily armed and had 
High - 
keeping the 
gas secret 
Even following the 
chemical attack and the 
storming, the Russian 
Low – there was a 
high conflict 
between neutralizing 
High – the use of 
the untested gas 
resulted in the 
Low - given the 
kidnappers’ 
uncompromising 
Narrow – given the 
threat to the 
hostages’ lives, the 
The armed Chechens who claimed 
allegiance to the Islamist militant 
separatist movement in Chechnya 
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Theater 
Hostage 
Crisis  
bombs, but details were lacking 
and their exact number (40-50) 
was unknown. 
Plan formulation: radical and very 
risky decision to use a super-
powerful knock-out gas. 
Plan execution: controversial (Out 
of 850 hostages, 129 were killed 
by the gas whose chemical 
composition was not revealed 
even to the medical emergency 
teams).        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
from the 
medical 
rescue teams 
after the raid 
made the 
authorities 
look 
complicit in 
the deaths of 
hostages. – 
Also, the 
ease of 
hostage-
taking makes 
the construal 
of an 
alternative 
outcome 
easy. 
authorities still refused 
to disclose the full 
nature of the knock-out 
gas, hampering the 
medical efforts to treat 
the affected hostages. 
Also, the medical 
workers were left 
unprepared as they 
were expecting to treat 
victims of explosions 
and gunfire but not a 
secret chemical agent.   
 
 
 
  
the uncompromising 
hostage-takers and 
putting the hostages 
in harm’s way. The 
self-presentation of 
the terrorists as a 
suicide squad 
combined with their 
threat to start killing 
the hostages before 
dawn hastened the 
use of the gas. 
         
deaths of 
kidnappers and 
hostages alike.     
 
.  
 
and unrealistic 
demands for the 
withdrawal of 
Russian forces from 
Chechnya, left little 
room for decision 
inertia regarding 
the use of force. 
The question was 
not if, but when the 
force could be used 
to save the optimal 
number of hostages   
security services had 
a relatively limited 
amount of time to 
analyse all their 
availablel options. 
demanded the withdrawal of 
Russian forces from Chechnya and 
an end to the Second Chechen War. 
They ignored the official Kremlin 
line that ‘Russia does not negotiate 
with terrorists. Russia destroys 
them’. Cell phone conversations 
between the hostages trapped in 
the theatre and their family 
members revealed that the 
terrorists 
had grenades, mines and improvised 
explosive devices trapped to their 
bodies. They also threatened to kill 
10 hostages for any of their number 
killed if the security forces 
intervened.  
C - The 
2004 
Beslan 
School 
Hostage 
Crisis  
Situational assessment: poor and 
similar to that of the Moscow 
Siege (only later was the exact 
number of 32 terrorists forcing 
1200 adults and children into the 
school gymnasium known).  It 
was unknown that encircling 
them on the floor were bombs 
connected by cables, and that 
bombs were taped to the walls 
and suspended from the ceiling. 
The children were placed along 
the windows to act as human 
shields, however, were visible 
from afar.                                           
Plan formulation: very unclear 
and compounded by high 
accountability. When 2 rocket 
grenades were fired from inside 
the building there was no return 
fire as the risk of reprisals for the 
hostages was too great.  
Pan execution: very poor and 
chaotic (e.g., armed relatives 
Medium – 
the sheer 
number of 
provincial 
schools in 
Russia makes 
it almost 
impossible to 
prevent a 
similar event 
from 
happening 
again. The 
Booby-
trapping of 
the 
gymnasium 
makes it hard 
to imagine 
how all the 
hostages 
could have 
been safely 
rescued. If 
Despite the previous 
experiences of the 
2002 Moscow theatre 
hostage crisis, no fire-
fighting equipment was 
in position and there 
were few ambulances. 
Following a (possibly 
accidental) explosion in 
the gymnasium, which 
collapsed the roof and 
started a massive fire, a 
chaotic gunfight started 
between the terrorists 
and the security cordon 
consisting of armed 
policemen and 
untrained militiamen. 
Very Low – the 
conflict between 
neutralising the 
terrorist threat and 
saving the children’s 
lives was even 
greater than in the 
case of Moscow 
Theatre siege.  The 
unexpected 
explosion which 
collapsed the roof 
increased the 
uncertainty further, 
prompting the 
Russian authorities 
to respond with 
force.   
 
 
 
 
  
Low – the 
hostages were not 
just Russians, but 
children, leaving 
the option of 
chemical weapons 
use and highly 
controversial 
Moscow Theatre 
Siege-like rescue 
attempt off the 
table.                                                                                       
 
  
Medium – although 
the kidnappers’ 
demands were very 
similar to those 
from the Moscow 
Theatre Siege, the 
presence of 
hundreds of young 
children made the 
decision on any 
rescue attempt 
extremely difficult
and historically 
unprecedented 
with the highest 
accountability 
repercussions, This 
was further 
compounded by the 
threat to kill 50 
hostages for each 
killed terrorist.                    
Very narrow - given 
the threat to the 
children’s’ lives, the 
security services had 
a very limited 
amount of time to 
analyse all their 
available options.  
Similarly to the Moscow Theatre 
siege, the terrorists demanded 
recognition of the independence of 
Chechnya at the UN and Russian 
withdrawal from Chechnya. They 
also mined the gym and the rest of 
the building with IEDs, and 
surrounded it with tripwires, 
smashing the school’s windows to 
avoid being overwhelmed by a gas 
agent like their comrades in the 
Moscow theatre.  
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mingled with the troops and ran 
towards the buildings getting 
caught in the cross-fire 
(331 people died, including 186 
children, more than 700 were 
injured)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
the 
untrained 
militiamen 
had been 
kept away, 
the rescue
would have 
likely been 
better. 
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Table 3. Three Critical High Stake Decision on National/International Security  
Incident 
case 
Safe-t model Outcome 
mutability   
Potential 
derailment factors 
Choice  deferral  Effort accuracy trade-
off  
Decision inertia Time horizon Cultural-historical and situational contexts   
A - The 
1962 Cuban 
Missile 
Crisis 
 
 
Situational assessment: very 
thorough (the development 
stage and level of threat posed 
by the several missile sites 
under construction was carefully 
evaluated and deemed as 
advanced). 
Plan formulation: very careful 
and restraint-oriented blockade 
of Cuba, presenting an 
avoidance-avoidance conflict. 
Plan execution: win-win - the 
American officials promised 
never to try to invade Cuba and 
(unofficially) to dismantle all 
nuclear Jupiter warheads in 
Turkey and Italy. In exchange, 
the Soviets abandoned their 
construction.                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Very high – 
regarded by 
the vast 
majority of 
historians as 
the first 
modern 
moment when 
the human 
species became 
endangered. 
The situation 
could have very 
easily resulted 
in a global 
thermo-nuclear 
war. 
Even when on  
27 October, a U-2 
plane was shot 
down by a Soviet 
missile crew (an 
action that could 
have resulted in 
immediate 
retaliation from 
the Kennedy crisis 
cabinet), the 
negotiations 
continued.                                           
Very high –the 
high certainty of 
mutually-assured 
destruction led to 
the 
postponement of 
any direct military 
confrontation. 
Sticking to 
‘defensive 
avoidance’ 
(current course of 
restrained action 
in the face of 
grim and riskier 
alternatives) 
appeared to be 
the safest option.               
Very low - great 
caution was exercised 
not to send a 
premature signal that 
the other side might 
interpret as an all-out 
assault.      
 
 
 
Very high – the 
unprecedented 
prospect of a global 
thermo-nuclear war 
left Kennedy and 
Khrushchev with 
very little room for 
safe action, except 
for mutual 
concessions. The 
action effect 
(associating action 
with more regret 
than inaction) might 
also shed some light 
on their strategies. 
Relatively wide 
– both 
Washington 
and Moscow 
had the 
sufficient time 
to analyse all 
the relevant 
information and 
carefully 
consider all 
their options. 
Following the placement of nuclear missiles 
in Turkey and Italy, aimed at Moscow, and 
the failed US attempt to overthrow the 
Cuban regime, in May 1962 Nikita 
Khrushchev proposed the idea of deploying 
Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any 
future invasion. During a meeting between 
Khrushchev and Fidel Castro that July, a 
secret agreement was reached and 
construction of several missile sites began in 
the late summer. This construction was 
noticed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
secured clear photographic evidence 
of medium-range and intermediate-range 
ballistic nuclear missiles on the ground. The 
USA considered attacking Cuba via air and 
sea, but decided on a military blockade 
instead, euphemistically calling it a 
‘quarantine.’ During the tense negotiations 
several Soviet ships attempted to run the 
blockade, resulting in orders being sent out 
to US Navy ships to fire warning shots and 
then open fire.  
B - The 
1995 
Norwegian 
Rocket 
Incident 
Situational assessment: low (the 
Russian equipment could not tell 
the suspected Trident missile 
from a meteorological rocket. 
Plan formulation: no time for any 
plan – standard nuclear defense 
procedure was initiated. 
Plan execution: a full alert was 
passed up through the military 
chain of command all the way to 
President Boris Yeltsin who 
activated his nuclear keys for the 
first time.  In light of an 
avoidance-avoidance conflict, the 
High – the 
unreliable 
Russian missile 
detection 
systems and its 
huge nuclear 
arsenal still 
make the 
potential 
nuclear 
exchange vivid 
and current 
even today. 
 
The Russians 
should have been 
notified of the 
rocket launch. The 
Americans and 
Norwegians 
should have 
considered the 
outdated Russian 
missile detection 
systems.   
 
High - before the 
Russians realized 
the rocket was 
not a Trident 
missile, they 
faced great 
uncertainty. As its 
trajectory did not 
approach any 
major Russian 
city, this 
uncertainty was 
reduced and the 
Russians could 
afford to post-
pone any 
Very low – the final 
confirmation of the 
status of the rocket 
was too critical to 
allow for any 
inaccurate judgments.  
High – given the 
ambiguity of the 
radar signal, the 
rocket’s trajectory 
and extremely high 
stakes, it was far too 
risky to make a 
decision on the 
nuclear retaliation.     
Very narrow – 
there was no 
time to 
carefully 
analyse all the 
available 
information and 
consider all the 
options.  
In contrast to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
October 1962, this incident had a much 
shorter build-up and occurred in the post-
Cold War era, where many Russians were 
still very suspicious of the United 
States and NATO. When a team 
of Norwegian and American scientists 
launched a Black Brant XII four-
stage sounding rocket with scientific 
equipment to study the aurora 
borealis over Svalbard off the north-western 
coast of Norway on January 25, 1995, it flew 
on a high northbound trajectory, which 
included an air corridor that stretches 
from Minuteman-III nuclear missile silos 
in North Dakota, all the way to Moscow. 
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Russian commanders went into a 
state of combat readiness and 
prepared for nuclear retaliation 
until the rocket started heading 
away from the Russian airspace. 
premature or 
unwarranted 
retaliation.  
During its flight, the rocket eventually 
reached an altitude of 1,453 kilometres, 
resembling a U.S. Navy submarine-
launched Trident missile.  
C – The 
2002 
Search for 
WMDs in 
Iraq  
Situation assessment: low. The 
UN inspectors were not given 
enough time to gather the 
essential intelligence. The data 
on the storage facilities at 
Khamisiyah and Muhammadiyat 
were ambiguous and unclear. 
Plan formulation: very poor. The 
‘Coalition of the Willing’ was not 
prepared for the spectacular 
absence of WMDs, let alone the 
transition of power in Iraq. 
Plan execution: poor. The 
invasion led to unsystematic and 
chaotic searches that did not 
take any potential insurgency-
related problems into account.  
High – as the 
UN weapons 
inspectors 
were not given 
enough time to 
complete their 
search and the 
Hussein regime 
expressed its 
willingness to 
cooperate with 
them, it 
appears that 
the 
disarmament 
did not require 
any military 
intervention.  
The Hussein 
regime had 
already gone back 
on its word and 
thus its last-
minute willingness 
to cooperate had 
to be treated with 
suspicion. The 
Bush 
administration 
was also 
motivated by the 
change of power 
in the region and 
the Iraqi oil.  
Very high – as the 
Hussein regime 
did not pose or 
announce any 
direct or 
immediate 
security threat to 
its neighbors or 
to the West, the 
search for the 
WMDs could have 
been more 
thorough and 
longer.  
High – given the 
absence of any direct 
security threat posed 
by the Hussein regime, 
the search for the 
WMDs did not have to 
involve any invasion at 
all to determine their 
presence. 
Very high – given 
the tenuous 
evidence for the 
presence of WMDs, 
which even the key 
American Nato allies 
questioned, as well 
as no direct threat 
by the Hussein 
regime, the decision 
to eliminate the 
weapons by 
invasion was fraught 
with risks and could 
have been 
postponed or 
avoided altogether. 
Wide – there 
was sufficient 
time to allow 
the weapons 
inspectors to 
finish their job, 
analyse all the 
available 
information and 
carefully 
consider all the 
options. 
Saddam Hussein was known for his use of 
chemical weapons in the 1980s 
against Iranian and Kurdish civilians during 
and after the Iran–Iraq War. Also, in the 
1980s he pursued an extensive biological 
weapons program and a nuclear weapons 
program. After 
the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, the United 
Nations located and destroyed large 
quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons with 
mixed degrees of Iraqi cooperation. In 
response to diminishing Iraqi cooperation, 
the USA called for withdrawal of all UN 
and IAEA inspectors in 1998, resulting 
in Operation Desert Fox. During the lead-up 
to war in March 2003, United Nations 
weapons inspector, Hans Blix, claimed that 
Iraq made significant progress toward 
resolving open issues of disarmament 
noting the ‘proactive’ but not always 
‘immediate’ cooperation, concluding that it 
would take ‘but months’ to resolve the key 
remaining disarmament tasks. 
D- The 
2010 Gaza 
Flotilla Raid  
Situational assessment: very 
difficult. Given the immediate 
threat of death posed by the 
uncooperative and aggressive 
armed Turkish crew, the Israeli 
commandos had no time to 
accurately evaluate the danger 
they were in. 
Plan formulation: no time for any 
plan (emergency self-defense 
procedure was initiated). 
High – 
alternative 
ways of 
stopping the 
flotilla make 
the loss of 
human life 
appear to have 
been 
completely 
unnecessary.  
The raid was very 
poorly 
coordinated and 
executed. For 
example, when 
the commandos 
tried boarding the 
ship, activists cut 
the ladders with 
electric disc saws. 
When a 
Very low – the 
commandos were 
under such high 
pressure to act 
fast that they 
probably did not 
have the time to 
fully analyse the 
conflict between 
protecting 
themselves and 
High – the Israeli 
commandos under 
attack had little time 
to make an accurate 
self-defense judgment 
and accurately assess 
how to respond 
proportionately. 
Neutralising the 
apparent threat 
became imperative.  
Very low – given the 
threat of death 
posed by the 
uncooperative and 
aggressive armed 
Turkish crew, the 
commandos 
probably could not 
afford not to use 
their weapons.                     
Very narrow – 
facing the 
imminent 
danger to their 
lives, the Israeli 
soldiers did not 
have the 
sufficient time 
to carefully 
evaluate the full 
situation 
The operation (code named Operation Sea 
Breeze or Operation Sky Winds) was an 
attempt to block the Free Gaza Movement's 
ninth attempt to break the naval 
blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza 
Strip. Israel claims that the blockade is 
necessary to limit Palestinian rocket 
attacks from the Gaza Strip on its cities and 
to prevent Hamas from obtaining other 
weapons. The flotilla was carrying 
humanitarian aid and construction 
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Plan execution: nine activists 
were killed and many were 
wounded.  Ten of the 
commandos were also wounded, 
one of them seriously, which was 
followed by one of the worst 
diplomatic breakdowns in Israel’s 
history. 
 rope was dropped 
from the 
helicopter onto 
the ship, the 
activists seized it 
and tied it to the 
deck. They also 
may have 
mistaken flash 
grenades and 
paintball guns for 
deadly weapons. 
putting the crew 
in harm’s way. 
 
  
 
onboard the 
vessel.                     
materials. Israel proposed inspecting the 
cargo at the Port of Ashdod and then 
delivering non-blockaded goods through 
land crossings, but this proposal was 
rejected, leading to a commando raid from 
speedboats and helicopters. The lessons 
from the PR disaster seem to have been 
learned when in March 2014 a Gaza-bound 
civilian vessel with Iranian surface to surface 
missiles was raided by much more prepared 
Israeli commandos who this time 
proactively avoided putting the civilian crew 
in harm’s way . 
 
 
